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TIME: Almanac 1990
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1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
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071089
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07108900.033
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1990-09-17
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WORLD, Page 30CUBAReading the Coca LeavesA drug case ensnares top officials and raises questions aboutwhat Castro is up toBy Jill Smolowe
Through two days of testimony, Major General Arnaldo Ochoa
Sanchez sat with his head bowed, absently fingering his uniform,
his downcast eyes glazed with an expression that suggested
dejection or resignation. He neither smiled when the tribunal of
47 generals and admirals praised his past acts of military valor
in places as far-flung as Angola and Ethiopia nor frowned when it
branded him a traitor and called for his execution. When Ochoa
finally rose to speak, he denied none of the charges: consorting
with international drug dealers, illicitly trafficking in
everything from cocaine and diamonds to ivory and sugar, shaming
the Cuban revolution with acts of high treason. "I betrayed our
country, and one pays for treason with one's life," Ochoa said.
"If the death sentence comes, which of course could mean the firing
squad, I promise you that my last thoughts will be of Fidel and
this great revolution."
Thus ended the most sensational corruption scandal to hit Cuba
since Fidel Castro seized power three decades ago. But the
titillating proceeding raised more questions than it answered. On
the one hand, the hearing seemed to signal Castro's determination
to crack down on official corruption and take a leading role in
stanching the tide of drugs that courses through Latin America and
washes up on North American shores. On the other hand, the charges
aired in the hearing made a mockery of Castro's repeated insistence
that Cuba has an "unimpeachable record" when it comes to drugs.
Despite solid evidence that drug-laden planes and boats have
traversed Cuban waterways and airspace for years, the Drug
Enforcement Administration and other U.S. agencies have no hard
proof that the Cuban government ever sanctioned the illicit
traffic. By nabbing such high-level comrades in the narcotics net,
Castro could not help prompting such questions as whether -- and
for how long -- he had turned a blind eye to the trafficking.
The corruption case unfolded with suspicious speed. Ochoa and
six other military and Interior Ministry officials were arrested
in early June. Ten days later, the Communist Party daily Granma
gave a stunningly detailed account, accusing the seven men of
pocketing $3.4 million for helping Colombia's infamous Medellin
cartel transport six tons of cocaine to Florida. By the time
Ochoa's hearing was convened two weeks later with all the haste and
splash of the ongoing scapegoat trials in China, it was a foregone
conclusion that this popular and much decorated military officer
would be found guilty. Ochoa's court-martial began last Friday, and
all that remains now is the firing squad or an eleventh-hour
display of leniency on Castro's part.
According to Granma, Ochoa initially tried his hand at money
laundering for drug dealers based in Panama, but early last year
found a more profitable line of work. Ochoa and an aide forged an
alliance with Colonel Antonio de La Guardia, in charge of Cuba's
program to circumvent the U.S.'s 29-year economic embargo. Because
La Guardia, who was also arrested, was responsible for organizing
blockade runners to transport computers and other goods out of the
U.S., he had contacts with foreign businessmen and smugglers and
had the authority to carry out secret operations. In May 1988
Ochoa's aide traveled to Medellin to meet with Pablo Escobar
Gaviria, one of Colombia's most notorious drug barons. Escobar
offered Ochoa & Co. $1,200 for every kilo the Cubans helped
transport to the U.S. Over the next year, La Guardia arranged 15
successful operations, allowing the drugs to be dropped off either
on Cuban land or in Cuban waters and then transferred to speedboats
destined for Florida.
But why did Castro approve such a public spectacle? Was his
target audience his Latin neighbors, the gringos to the north, or
officers within Cuba's military ranks? There seem to be as many
theories as there are analysts. Some speculated that the drug purge
was designed to improve Castro's tarnished image with his Latin
American neighbors, who have little patience for Cuba's Communist
bent in an age of fledgling democracies. The move also distanced
Cuba from the drug-tainted administration of Manuel Antonio Noriega
in Panama, with which Cuba has been known to have dealings.
Professor Enrique Baloyra of the University of Miami offered
what he calls the "Havana-gate theory," that Castro turned the
tables on his drug-trafficking cohorts in an attempt to mask his
own involvement. By this account, Ochoa fell on his own sword to
save the Jefe. Certainly Ochoa went out of his way during his
half-hour confession to absolve Castro of any complicity. Those
analysts who suspected that high-level Cuban officials were less
innocent of the drug scheme than they let on pointed to one small
irony: the tribunal included Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado, who
in 1982 was one of four Cuban officials indicted in Miami for
conspiring with a notorious Colombian drug smuggler. Because there
is no extradition treaty between the U.S. and Cuba, the four men
never stood trial.
Some State Department officials suggested that Castro seized
the drug issue as a way to begin a rapprochement with Washington.
Their projection was based on recent conciliatory remarks from Cuba
hinting at a desire for better ties, and past overtures by Castro
to cooperate on hijackings and immigration. Others at State were
inclined to accept the explanation offered by Granma, that the
Cuban government opened an investigation last April after rumors
from friends and complaints from the U.S. suggested that the
authorized operation to break the American embargo was being used
to transport drugs. Many analysts think that Castro was genuinely
outraged to learn of the drug running; the Cuban leader is known
to be a moralist who hates drugs and corruption.
Those who believe that Ochoa's public humiliation was part of
a politically inspired housecleaning were handed some potent
ammunition last week: the firing of Cuba's Interior Minister,
General Jose Abrantes, for the "great deficiency" of failing to
uncover Ochoa's drug operation. It is possible that there are more
firings to come. But an editorial signed by Castro stated that
Abrantes was taking an inevitable rap for the corruption that
transpired on his watch. In recent months the Interior Ministry has
fallen into disfavor for not halting a sharp rise in crime and
official corruption.
Few U.S. experts on Cuba embraced the possibility that Castro
was foiling a coup attempt. But many did point to a restlessness
in the military ranks: some officers feel they have not been
properly compensated for their war duty in Angola and are believed
to favor a glasnost-style easing of Cuba's repressive political
atmosphere.
If Castro moved on Ochoa to send a message to the military, he
could not have picked a better target. Enormously popular among
the troops, Ochoa is a veteran of Castro's revolution who has
commanded troops in Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. In 1984 he
received the Hero of the Cuban Republic medal, the military's
highest honor. Last week Ochoa was removed as a full member of the
Communist Party Central Committee and an elected delegate to the
National Assembly. The move against Ochoa may have been personal
as well as symbolic. His popularity may have threatened Defense
Minister Raul Castro, who is expected to succeed his brother as the
country's chief power broker.
Several U.S. cases have already implicated high-level Cubans
in trafficking. In February 1988, for instance, 17 people were
indicted in Miami on charges of smuggling drugs from South America,
some of it through Cuba, into South Florida. Last March, when
Reinaldo Ruiz, a Cuban-born U.S. citizen, and his son Ruben pleaded
guilty, Dexter Lehtinen, the U.S. Attorney in Miami, released a
videotape on which Ruben stated that the Ruiz operation had secured
cooperation from Cuban officers to use military runways as transit
points. Of Cuba's compensation, Ruben said, "The money went into
Fidel's drawer" -- a charge that has not been substantiated.
Lehtinen says that the names of some of those arrested in the Ochoa
scandal turned up during the Ruiz investigation.
Castro's true motives for Ochoa's unceremonious ouster may
eventually become clear. In the meantime, Cubans are watching
Granma for the next twist, and the Bush Administration is
proceeding with caution. Last week the President told the Miami
Herald that Cuba would have to do "much more" to improve ties with
the U.S. Meanwhile, there were reports that planes continue to
smuggle drugs over Cuba, making a mockery of a recent pledge by
Cuban officials to shoot down unauthorized planes violating its
airspace on the grounds that they were probably carrying drugs.
-- James Carney/Miami and Ricardo Chavira/Washington